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WHEN PUBLIC REPORTING MISLEADS THE PUBLIC:
THE CASE OF MEDICARE’S HOSPITAL
COMPARE MORTALITY MODEL
Jeffrey H. Silber, M.D., Ph.D.*

INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the new Medicare mortality model was introduced with
great fanfare. It was a web-based application that allowed the public
to click on hospitals of their choosing and compare, among other
things, the thirty-day mortality rate for patients admitted for various
conditions, including “heart attack” or acute myocardial infarction.
This was a special moment for Medicare, as a previous mortality
model utilized for hospital comparisons was introduced over twenty
years earlier, only to be discredited and retired from use over a decade later because of demonstrably biased estimates.1 The new Medicare Hospital Compare mortality model was fundamentally different
from previous public reporting models. It was thought to introduce
advances from the field of Bayesian statistics to aid in making better
predictions for patients and to solve a particularly difficult problem
concerning how to report hospital mortality rates when hospitals are
small and mortality rates are unstable.
Unfortunately, the Hospital Compare model made (and continues
to make) assumptions that produce large underestimates of mortality
rates in small hospitals and overestimates of mortality rates in large
hospitals. Over the past decade the model has not been appreciably
changed, despite a growing realization that problems exist with the
model2 and consequently, the advice given by the Medicare model to
* Professor, Department of Pediatrics, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania. Professor, Department of Health Care Management, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania. Silber presented this topic at the Clifford Symposium held at DePaul University
College of Law on April 19, 2018.
1. Jesse Green, The Importance of Severity of Illness in Assessing Hospital Mortality, 263
JAMA 241, 243 (1990).
2. Jeffrey H. Silber et al., The Hospital Compare Mortality Model and the Volume–Outcome
Relationship, 45 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1148, 1161 (2010) [hereinafter Silber et al., The Hospital
Compare Mortality Model]; see also ARLENE S. ASH ET AL., STATISTICAL ISSUES IN ASSESSING
HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE 1 (2012); Edward I. George et al., Mortality Rate Estimation and
Standardization for Public Reporting: Medicare’s Hospital Compare, 112 JAMA 933, 933 (2017);
Dana B. Mukamel et al., Measuring Quality for Public Reporting of Health Provider Quality:
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the public remains misleading. This Article will present a brief history
of public reporting of hospital outcomes, place the present Medicare
Hospital Compare model in context regarding this history, describe
the flaw in the present Hospital Compare model, suggest reasonable
ways to correct the problem, and examine why Medicare has not acted
to change the model.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REPORTING
OF HOSPITAL OUTCOMES
While many may say that the reporting of hospital mortality rates
dates back to Florence Nightingale’s examination of infection rates
during the Crimean War,3 or to Ernest Codman’s examination of mortality rates at Massachusetts General Hospital in 1918,4 I would contend that the use of formal statistical analysis to explore variation in
hospital quality through examining hospital mortality rates really
dates back to the time of Moses—that is Lincoln Moses and Frederick
Mosteller’s classic 1968 paper in the Journal of the American Medical
Association titled Institutional Differences in Postoperative Death
Rates: Commentary on Some of the Findings of the National Halothane
Study.5 Their paper was a secondary analysis of the National
Halothane Study, performing formal statistical adjustments on the
thirty-four participating hospitals in the study to determine whether
there were excess deaths at some hospitals.6 Before adjusting for patient characteristics, they found a twenty-four-fold difference between
the highest and lowest hospital mortality rates.7 After statistical adjustment they found a three-fold difference, but this difference was
statistically significant.8 Moses and Mosteller concluded that such differences may relate to quality, but feared a “circus” of analyses examining hospital quality through such adjustments.9
Making It Meaningful to Patients, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 264, 266–67 (2010); Jeffrey H. Silber
et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model, 51 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1229,
1230 (2016) [hereinafter Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model].
3. Lisa I. Iezzoni, 100 Apples Divided by 15 Red Herrings: A Cautionary Tale from the Mid19th Century on Comparing Hospital Mortality Rates, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1079, 1079
(1996).
4. LISA I. IEZZONI, RISK ADJUSTMENT FOR MEASURING HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES 11
(4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter IEZZONI, RISK ADJUSTMENT FOR MEASURING HEALTH CARE
OUTCOMES].
5. See generally Lincoln E. Moses & Fredrick Mosteller, Institutional Differences in Postoperative Death Rates: Commentary on Some of the Findings of the National Halothane Study, 203
JAMA 492, 492 (1968).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 494.
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After the National Halothane Study was published, there were numerous studies examining hospital quality of care. Of course, since
patients are not randomized to hospitals, these studies are observational in nature and hence, always must account for selection bias.
Some hospitals treat sicker patients and therefore these variations in
severity of illness must be accounted for in any analysis.
“Indirect standardization” is the typical method by which hospitals
are compared.10 Indirect standardization can be thought of as a comparison of the observed number of deaths (O) at a hospital to the
expected number of deaths (E), and this is often referred to as the “O/
E ratio.”11 If one hospital has more deaths than expected, its quality
of care is considered worse than another hospital with a lower O/E.
Hospitals want to have O/E ratios below 1, and it is even better if
these hospitals can be shown to have a ratio below 1 with statistical
confidence. When examining the many hospital report card systems
currently in use, most use indirect standardization of one form or another and most report O/E for specific hospitals. One of the earliest
and best-known hospital and physician report cards was the New York
State Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery report, which began to be produced in 1986.12 While these reports have gained in sophistication
over the years, the report uses a risk adjustment model to estimate the
probability of dying for each patient at a hospital undergoing coronary
artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery, and sums these probabilities
to get an expected death rate.13 It then provides the actual death rate
and allows the reader to compare the O/E ratio for each hospital.14
In 1983, Medicare changed the way it paid hospitals, moving from a
retrospective payment system (i.e., after a hospitalization, hospitals
sent bills to Medicare and were paid some fraction of usual and customary charges), to a prospective payment system (i.e., hospitals were
paid a pre-specified amount based on the diagnosis related group

10. Jeffery H. Silber et al., Template Matching for Auditing Hospital Cost and Quality, 49
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1446, 1447 (2014).
11. Id.; see also JOSEPH L. FLEISS ET AL., STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND PROPORTIONS 631 (2003).
12. See Edward L. Hannan et al., The New York State Cardiac Registries: History, Contributions, Limitations, and Lessons for Future Efforts to Assess and Publicly Report Healthcare Outcomes, 59 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 2309, 2309 (2012) [hereinafter Hannan et al., The New
York State Cardiac Registries].
13. Id. at 2310–11; see also Edward L. Hannan et al., The Decline in Coronary Artery Bypass
Graft Surgery Mortality in New York State: The Role of Surgeon Volume, 273 JAMA 209, 209
(1995).
14. Hannan et al., The New York State Cardiac Registries, supra note 12, at 2311.
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(DRG) that the patient fell into).15 This new payment system (which
is still used today) raised concerns that hospitals would become incentivized to provide less-costly care, since hospitals’ profits or losses
were determined by whether they spent more or less on a patient
compared to the DRG rate. In response to these concerns in the new
payment environment, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), previously known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), became very keen on examining hospital quality of
care, so they developed the HCFA Mortality model. The model estimated O/E for every hospital in the country and was published in
state-specific books.16 The HCFA model results appeared on each
page of the report and a letter from the Hospital’s CEO appeared on
the following page. When the O/E numbers were not good (i.e., above
1) the excuses from the CEOs generally stated that the patients at
their hospital were sicker than what the HCFA model estimated. So,
while reports correctly stated the O (just a count of deaths at that
hospital), Hospital CEOs argued the E was too low (underestimating
the sickness of their patients), resulting in an O/E ratio above 1.17 The
reports continued to be produced, but began to meet opposition from
those concerned that the E was not being correctly estimated. Finally,
in 1996, Jesse Green demonstrated convincingly that the HCFA model
was profoundly biased because it “underestimate[d] the death rates
for high-risk patients and overestimate[d] them for low-risk patients.”18 By 1997, the model stopped being provided to the public.
There would not be a new mortality model for public consumption
from Medicare until 2007.
II. THE SMALL NUMBERS PROBLEM
For many years, healthcare analysts have been concerned about
public reporting when there are small numbers of patients at a hospital. The problem with small numbers is that reported outcome rates
may be unstable. Mark Chassin and his co-authors published a paper
in 1988 that clearly described the problem of small numbers when an15. See generally John K. Iglehart, Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals, 308
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1428 (1983).
16. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE HOSPITAL MORTALITY INFORMATION: ILLINOIS, INDIANA, MICHIGAN REGION V (1987),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015012739465;view=1up;seq=3.
17. IEZZONI, RISK ADJUSTMENT FOR MEASURING HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at
345–48.
18. Green, supra note 1, at 243.
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alyzing hospital mortality in heart attack admissions.19 The paper described the problem by plotting the mortality rate for each hospital on
the vertical axis (y-axis) and hospital volume on the horizontal axis (xaxis).20 Hospital mortality rates went from 0% to 100%, and hospital
volume of heart attack patients went from 1 to 300 per year.21 While
the central tendency was approximately a 20% mortality rate, there
was tremendous variability at low-volume hospitals and far less variation at high-volume hospitals. This funnel shape is well-known in statistics and reflects a binomial process. The authors were concerned
that calling a low-volume hospital a high-mortality outlier may just be
due to statistical variation, i.e., if a hospital only sees one heart attack
patient and the patient dies, the hospital suddenly has a 100% death
rate even though their average might approach 20% if they saw more
patients. So these authors decided to rank hospitals not by the O/E
ratio, but instead by the p-value associated with how different O was
from E.22 Since the p-values only indicate the magnitude of statistical
significance, the ranking also had to take into consideration the direction of the difference—a very good or high rank of a hospital (associated with a statistically significant O below E), and a poor or low rank
for a hospital (associated with a statistically significant O above E)—
with all rankings performed on these constructed p-values. While it
was admirable for Hospital Compare’s developers to be concerned
about these small-volume hospitals and their unstable mortality rates,
the problem with ranking by p-value is that small hospitals will always
look average, since small numbers will prevent any difference of O
and E from being statistically significant. Hence, small hospitals look
average, and only big hospitals have the potential to look better or
worse than average. Not surprisingly, ranking by p-value did not catch
on for hospital public reporting.
III. THE HOSPITAL COMPARE MORTALITY MODEL
In response to Medicare’s need for monitoring hospital quality, a
new model was developed and introduced in 2007. HCFA had
changed its name to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) by 2007, and it created a CMS website where patients could
examine individual hospitals for their adjusted mortality, among other
19. Mark R. Chassin, Differences Among Hospitals in Medicare Patient Mortality, 24 HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 1, 29 (1989). Mark Chassin became the Public Health Commissioner of New York
and helped introduce the New York State CABG report cards.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 11–13.
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items. The new model was developed by Krumholz and his co-authors23 based on what is called a Hierarchical Random Effects Logistic Regression model.24 The model was purported to be a good
estimator of mortality, so that it could be used for the denominator in
indirect standardization (O/E), and the model also purported to address the “small numbers” problem in the numerator by “borrowing
strength”25 from the overall mortality rate observed across the entire
distribution of hospitals. The entire distribution of hospitals refers to
the bell-shaped curve of all the hospital-specific heart attack mortality
rates at all hospitals that see heart attack patients in the United States.
Instead of having CMS report O/E rates to the public, the new CMS
approach was to report Predicted to Expected rates (P/E), substituting
O (i.e., a simple count of a hospital’s deaths) for P (i.e., a prediction of
these deaths which is stabilized for the small numbers problem).26
Small hospital death rates were considered unstable, so these reported
numerators were “shrunken” or moved in the direction of the mean
mortality value over all hospitals. Here the term “shrunken” refers to
a revised mortality estimate that is closer to the national mortality
estimate for heart attack patients. Hospital observed death rates
would be shrunken (moved toward the mean death rates across all
hospitals) based on how unstable the model believed an individual
hospital death rate was. The P in the P/E that is reported to the public
for any one hospital can be approximately described as a weighted
mixture of the observed hospital death rate and the national death
rate. For very small hospitals, the P provided to the public is often,
almost exactly just the national death rate because the model downweights the O derived from the small hospital with small numbers of
deaths. For large hospitals, P also generally reflects a number somewhere between the national rate and the large hospital’s O. The public
is no longer provided with the actual mortality rates because they are
considered too unstable to report.
One way to consider how the shrinkage works in a hierarchical random effects model like Hospital Compare is to consider the estimate
23. Harlan M. Krumholz et al., An Administrative Claims Model Suitable for Profiling Hospital Performance Based on 30-Day Mortality Rates Among Patients with an Acute Myocardial
Infarction, 113 CIRCULATION 1683, 1684 (2006) [hereinafter Krumholz et al., An Administrative
Claims Model]; Harlan M. Krumholz et al., Standards for Statistical Models Used for Public Reporting of Health Outcomes: An American Heart Association Scientific Statement From the Quality of Care and Outcomes Research Interdisciplinary Writing Group, 113 CIRCULATION 456, 460
(2006).
24. Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model, supra note 2, at
1230.
25. ASH ET AL., supra note 2, at 15–16.
26. Krumholz et al., An Administrative Claims Model, supra note 23, at 1648.
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of P as a linear combination of O and the overall estimated national
mean mortality rate for the actual patients seen at the hospital of interest. Reference rate E is the expected rate of death for the patients
at the hospital of interest had they been treated at the typical hospital.27 The linear combination can be written as P = l O + (1 - l) E.
One can solve for the weight (l) on any given hospital’s observed
mortality (O) rate using the raw data used in the Hospital Compare
model and obtaining the hospital’s P and E. After doing this computation, we found that for small hospitals in the lowest twentieth percentile, l is near 0.05, suggesting that P is almost entirely reporting the
national mortality rate (which was weighted by 0.95). Even for very
large hospitals, the Hospital Compare model assigns a l weight generally below 0.5. Therefore, the public is being provided stabilized mortality rates that are made up anywhere from 50% to 95% from the
national mortality rate. It is not hard to understand, therefore, that
small hospitals look average when 95% of the estimate for small hospitals is simply the national average. Not surprisingly, it follows that
Hospital Compare does not identify many outlier hospitals because
the problematic small hospitals are made to look average according to
the model.
It is important to realize that the Hospital Compare model utilized
to produce their P/E estimate predicts mortality only though patient
characteristics and the certainty with which the prediction is made.
But there are many hospital features that are predictive of differential
outcomes at different hospitals. So, hospital size, technology, nurse-tobed ratio, teaching status, or even the ability of the hospital to perform percutaneous cardiac interventions or CABG surgery does not
go into the model predicting the hospital-specific heart attack mortality rate. By not placing any hospital characteristics in the Hospital
Compare predictive model, the model shrinks small hospital mortality
rates to the overall typical hospital.28 This is precisely because it takes
no hospital characteristics into consideration when addressing the
small numbers problem, and it borrows strength only from the overall
distribution of all hospital mortality rates. Hospital Compare assumes
that small hospitals, like the typical hospital, would have a central tendency toward 20% mortality if only there were enough data to show
this. This is the crux of the problem with Hospital Compare’s approach. In reality, small hospitals likely have a different central tendency from the typical hospital precisely because they see fewer
27. Silber et al., The Hospital Compare Mortality Model, supra note 2, at 1159.
28. See generally Mukamel et al., supra note 2; Silber et al., The Hospital Compare Mortality
Model, supra note 2.
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patients and have less experience treating them. Small hospitals have
low patient volume, and because there are worse outcomes associated
with a low volume (assuming a volume-outcomes relationship), small
hospitals tend to have higher death rates than the typical hospital. Because Hospital Compare refuses to place hospital characteristics like
hospital volume or available technology in their model to estimate P
(in order to stabilize O), poor-performing small hospitals will be reported to the public as having average mortality rates when they may
be performing far worse than average.
Such a hierarchical random effects model is now the “gold standard” for many reporting systems. This Hospital Compare hierarchical random effects mortality model is used to rate hospitals by U.S.
News Consumer Reports29 and the Society for Thoracic Surgeons.30
As the most widely-used hospital public reporting system in the country, one may ask if the reports are biased. As I will develop in this
paper, the answer is, unfortunately, yes.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEMS IN THE HOSPITAL
COMPARE MORTALITY MODEL
In a series of studies at the University of Pennsylvania, my colleagues and I have been exploring if Hospital Compare may be providing misleading information to the public. In 2010, we published a
paper titled The Hospital Compare Mortality Model and the VolumeOutcome Relationship.31 We argued that, based on a vast literature,32
there is a well-known volume-outcome relationship for most aspects
of medicine, and that the more a provider does, the better the outcomes.33 Accordingly, it would make sense that small hospitals have
lower volume and may perform worse than their high-volume peers.
29. See generally How We Rate Hospitals, CONSUMERREPORTS (June 2018), http://article.ima
ges.consumerreports.org/prod/content/dam/cro/news_articles/health/PDFs/Hospital_Ratings_
Technical_Report.pdf.
30. See generally Sean M. O’Brien et al., An Empirically Based Tool for Analyzing Mortality
Associated with Congenital Heart Surgery, 138 J. THORACIC & CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 1139
(2009); STS CHSD Morality Risk Model, STS PUB. REPORTING ONLINE, https://publicreporting
.sts.org/chsd-risk-model (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
31. Silber et al., The Hospital Compare Mortality Model, supra note 2, at 1162.
32. Afschin Gandjour et al., Threshold Volumes Associated with Higher Survival in Health
Care: A Systematic Review, 41 MED. CARE 1129, 1136 (2003); Ethan A. Halm et al., Is Volume
Related to Outcome in Health Care? A Systematic Review and Methodologic Critique of the Literature, 137 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 511, 517 (2002); Harold S. Luft et al., The Volume-Outcome
Relationship: Practice-Makes-Perfect or Selective-Referral Patterns?, 22 HEALTH SERVS. RES.
157, 158 (1987); David M. Shahian & Sharon-Lise T. Normand, The Volume-Outcome Relationship: From Luft to Leapfrog, 75 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 1048, 1048–49 (2003).
33. Silber et al., The Hospital Compare Mortality Model, supra note 2, at 1149.
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Because the Hospital Compare model shrinks small hospital death
rates to the mean of all hospitals (precisely because the hospitals are
small), we hypothesized that small hospitals would be reported as average in the Hospital Compare model. We also hypothesized that if
each small hospital prediction was grouped over many small hospitals,
those small hospitals would look average when using the Hospital
Compare model. However, if we grouped all small hospital patients
together (so that there were no small numbers problems), we suspected that because each hospital had small volume, the volume-outcome relationship should dictate that as a group, these hospitals’
patients should display elevated mortality.34 Indeed, that is what we
reported. Hospital Compare was informing the public that thousands
of small hospitals were all average in performance on the mortality
model, suggesting that there was no difference across hospitals groups.
However, we found that as a group, the relative risk of death was 50%
higher at the smallest 20% of hospitals than the largest 20% of hospitals.35 For example, consider a patient attempting to decide whether to
stay affiliated with a small, local, suburban hospital or make the move
to be affiliated with a larger, urban hospital. The mortality rates in the
Hospital Compare model may reassure the suburban patient that the
local hospital is at least average when compared to the data of the two
options. However, had the patient considered a group of hospitals that
look like the local, small hospital, the patient would have seen that the
mortality rates were far higher at the small hospitals as a group. Thus,
unbeknownst to the patient, the larger, urban hospital may be the superior option because it is likely to have a lower mortality rate. In
subsequent work, we reconstructed the Hospital Compare model in a
fully Bayesian framework to allow us to form an even better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Hospital Compare
model.36
V.

CORRECTING THE ASSUMPTIONS
HOSPITAL COMPARE MODEL

OF THE

In an attempt to better understand why the Hospital Compare
model is providing such biased results, we have recently re-done the
Hospital Compare model in a Bayesian framework to examine the
cause and extent of the Medicare Hospital Compare model’s inade34. Id. at 1158.
35. Id. at 1159–61.
36. See generally Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model, supra
note 2.
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quacies.37 The underlying assumption in the Hospital Compare model
is that all hospitals are identical and part of the same national hospital
distribution, with a constant hospital heart attack mortality rate mean
and constant variance. Note, the mean and variance define the shape
of the hospital mortality rate distribution, assumed by the Hospital
Compare model to be normally distributed (again, describing a bellshaped distribution).38 In a series of models, we gradually relaxed this
assumption, suggesting instead that hospitals with specific characteristics may indeed have different mean mortality rates and different variances. Using a Bayesian framework, the data determined whether a
model for different types of hospitals was best fit with an overall mean
for all hospitals, or a separate mean for hospitals of different characteristics. We did this using split samples, so model development was
tested for predictive accuracy on an outside sample to avoid a tautological improvement. We found dramatic improvements in the models
when we “liberated” the mean and the variance, challenging the assumptions of the Hospital Compare model. We concluded that the
Hospital Compare model’s mistake was in shrinking all hospitals to
the same mean and variance (or assuming all hospitals came from the
same national distribution). We noted that, for example, shrinking the
mortality rate estimates of small-volume hospitals to resemble the
mean of the small-volume hospital death rates produced a far superior
estimate of P/E—one that is less biased—than shrinking small-volume
hospital mortality estimates to the mean of all hospital heart attack
death rates for the entire country. This was also true for other hospital
characteristics. Such accounting for hospital characteristics in the P of
P/E is something that has not been done by the Hospital Compare
model. Note, neither Hospital Compare nor our group would suggest
including hospital characteristics in predicting E, as E (the standard
against which hospital performance is judged) should only be based
on patient characteristics.
The size of the bias in the present form of Hospital Compare is
really quite remarkable. In a matched analysis recently published in
the Journal of the American Statistical Association, we reported that
hospitals in the lowest twentieth percentile by volume have an observed mortality rate of 28% for thirty-day mortality after admission,
and hospitals in the highest twentieth percentile by volume, treating
matched patients similar to the small-volume admissions, had an ob37. See generally George et al., supra note 2; Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital
Compare Mortality Model, supra note 2.
38. George et al., supra note 2, at 935; Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare
Mortality Model, supra note 2, at 1232.
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served mortality rate of only 20%.39 It would appear that larger hospitals had far lower mortality rates for similar patients seen at the lowvolume hospitals. However, using Hospital Compare’s methods, hospitals in the lowest twentieth percentile by volume would have a publicly-reported mortality rate of 23%—5% lower than the 28%
observed. Had the Hospital Compare model included the hospital
characteristic of volume in the prediction, something we have suggested Hospital Compare could do, the model would have estimated
the mortality rate at these smaller hospitals to be about 28% or 29%
(depending on the change in the model, much closer to the observed
28%).
To place that 5% underestimate of mortality at the smallest hospitals in context, such an error has very important consequences. If we
defined outlier hospitals using the Hospital Compare model, we
would report that out of 4,396 hospitals, only 30 hospitals were highmortality outliers. However, if we improve the model to allow hospital
characteristics to influence the prediction, we find that 1,028 hospitals
would be considered as mortality outliers.40 In yet another analysis,
using Chicago as an example, we found that the Hospital Compare
model portrays most hospitals as having very similar mortality rates.
However, when allowing the model to shrink to a mean that is a function of hospital volume, differences in hospital mortality rates for patients admitted for heart attacks clearly emerged.41
To fix the Hospital Compare model, we have argued that hospital
characteristics need to be placed in the predictive model.42 One obvious characteristic is hospital volume, but many other variables need to
be examined—such as available technology, nurse staffing, teaching
hospital status, to name a few. By not including these variables in their
model, Hospital Compare is assuming that shrinking mortality estimates to the mean of all hospitals produces better and unbiased estimates than shrinking to a target that accounts for potential hospital
differences. The assumption to exclude hospital characteristics from
the predictive model is clearly not consistent with the data.

39. George et al., supra note 2, at 941.
40. Id. at 945.
41. Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model, supra note 2, at
1236–37.
42. See generally George et al., supra note 2; Silber et al., The Hospital Compare Mortality
Model, supra note 2; Silber et al., Improving Medicare’s Hospital Compare Mortality Model,
supra note 2.
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Having repeatedly been shown to provide biased underestimates of
mortality for small hospitals, and biased overestimates of mortality for
larger hospitals, the question arises: Why has Medicare not yet fixed
the model? Medicare could place hospital characteristics in their
model to better estimate P, and therefore stabilize small-volume hospitals to the mortality rates of small-volume hospitals, as we have suggested above. The same would be true for any hospital characteristic
that influences mortality rates. For patients using the Hospital Compare model, such a fix would mean that when inquiring about small
hospitals, Hospital Compare could say something like “while this specific hospital is too small to provide a stable estimate, hospitals with
very similar characteristics to this hospital performed poorly, with a P/
E ratio of 1.3.” Such a statement may not help the individual hospital
know if it was performing better or worse than other, similar hospitals,
but patients would be given far more useful information than simply a
statement that suggests their small hospital performs exactly like the
typical hospital (with a P/E near 1), a statement that is biased.
Medicare may object to this suggested fix, stating that such a policy
of shrinking unstable estimates to peer group hospitals’ rates will possibly punish those few, extraordinary, small hospitals with excellent
outcomes. Our response would be that on average, the estimate that
shrinks mortality rates to peer hospitals’ rates is, by definition, demonstrably less biased than ignoring hospital characteristics. If hospital characteristics are ignored, then small hospitals, no matter how
good or bad, will be reported as average. From the patient’s perspective and across all hospitals, it is clear that by adding hospital characteristics to estimate P, the model will result in greater accuracy and
the reduction of bias. From the perspective of many hospitals who
now are reporting their outcomes as average, the fix to Hospital Compare will produce a potentially unflattering, though less biased, report
to the public. At the very least, adding in hospital characteristics may
produce more scrutiny of small-volume hospitals, or more scrutiny for
any hospitals that have their results stabilized.
Deciding to continue to utilize a model that has been shown to produce misleading and biased information for a segment of hospitals
seems to be an unwise choice. How to change the Hospital Compare
mortality model remains a policy question. If patients understood that
the mortality rates provided by Hospital Compare, and many other
report card systems, do not reflect the actual mortality rates at their
hospital, they may feel that change is needed. It is time that Medicare
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fix the Hospital Compare mortality model and improve the accuracy
of public reporting.
CONCLUSION
It is hard to understand why Medicare has not fixed the Hospital
Compare mortality model. One interesting question that may help explain this inaction is: Under what statutory authority are the rankings
promulgated? It is possible that there is legal precedent for forcing
Medicare to improve the model. On that same note, one could ask: Is
there legal liability attached to misleading the public in the rankings,
or could a large university hospital claim to be disparaged under any
existing law? Clearly there are winners and losers associated with the
decision by Medicare to not allow hospital characteristics in the predictive model. The result of this decision is that small hospitals tend to
look average, when as a group they perform worse than average. Correspondingly, large hospitals that perform exceedingly well will have
their outcomes shrunken (in the direction of reporting higher death
rates) towards the national mean, making them look less outstanding.
All this leads to a more confused and misinformed public when attempting to better understand the quality of care at their hospitals.
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